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In November 2011 Sweden abolished the uniform national electricity price and introduced separate price zones. 
This was the result of an antitrust settlement between the Commission and the Swedish network operator, which 
was accused of discriminating between domestic and export electricity transmission services and segmenting the 
internal market. Based on this case, we show how the Commission uses competition law enforcement to foster 
market integration in the energy sector. We find that, even though the Commission’s action under competition 
rules was contrived and lacked economic depth, the commitment package provides an economically sound, long-
term solution to network access and congestion management in Sweden. Such a quick and far-reaching change 
of Swedish congestion management could not have been achieved by Swedish policymakers or enforcement of 
the EU sector-specific regulation. 
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Electricity transmission networks can transport only a certain volume of electricity within the system 
security limits. This is referred to as the transmission capacity of the network. In Sweden, the national power 
grid lacks capacity to transmit cheap hydro electricity from the northern part of Sweden to the southern areas 
where there is high energy usage. In order to keep electricity flows within the system security limits, Svenska 
Kraftnät (SvK), the Swedish network operator, needs to take actions to relieve congestion on the internal 
bottlenecks.
2
 Congestion management can be defined as actions taken by a network operator to avoid or relieve 
transmission congestion. In November 2011, the Swedish electricity market was split into separate price areas, 
which is one of the possible actions to relieve congestion in the Swedish transmission network (so-called market 
splitting). Interestingly, in spite of an almost decade-long, multi-level debate on handling congestion in the 
Nordic market, the change in the Swedish market design came neither from the Swedish government, nor from 
the Swedish or Nordic regulatory bodies. Nor was it prompted by the EU regulations, promoting efficient and 
transparent congestion management. Instead, it was an outcome of an antitrust investigation launched by the 
European Commission (the Commission) against the Swedish network operator. Seen from this perspective, EU 
competition rules can be considered a complementary tool to achieve wider policy objectives,
3
 in addition to 
political debate and regulation. In this article, we look at the consequences of using competition rules to solve 
the problem of the Swedish transmission congestion, and more broadly, to promote EU market integration, 
against the backdrop of other two tools – political debate and regulation.  
First of all, we observe that the commitment procedure greatly facilitates the use of competition enforcement 
to achieve a primarily internal market objective, that is, to foster cross-border trade in electricity. However, in 
promoting inter-State trade at all costs, the Commission seems to lose sight of a wider economic and regulatory 
context of congestion management.  
Secondly, this case not only intensifies the Nordic debate on market splitting, but also accelerates the 
introduction of price zones in Sweden. Lastly, the remedies offered by SvK go beyond what could have been 
achieved by merely applying the EU sector specific regulation. While existing EU law regulates cross-border 
congestion management, without prescribing any specific congestion management method to deal with internal 
congestion, the Commission, by means of competition enforcement, actually pushed through market splitting.  
Overall, even though the Commission’s action under competition rules is contrived and lacks economic 
depth, the final commitment to split the market into separate price zones provides an economically sound, long-
run solution to Swedish congestion. We conclude that neither a political debate nor regulation would have 
changed the Swedish congestion management as quickly and to such an extent as an ad-hoc antitrust settlement. 
                                                          
2 There are four transmission bottlenecks in the Swedish grid, where demand for electricity transmission frequently exceeds the physical 
capacity of the network. Three out of them (called “cuts”: cut 1, cut 2 and cut 4) occur due to the southbound flow of cheap hydro power. 
The fourth bottleneck, the west-coast corridor, results from an increased transport from Denmark and the rest of Europe to the western coast 
of Sweden and further up to Norway. More on the characteristics of the Swedish electricity market see eg NordREG, Congestion 
Management in the Nordic Region. A common regulatory opinion on congestion management (Report 2/2007), 16-18; Commission Decision 
of 14 April 2010 in case COMP/39.351 – Swedish Interconnectors, 28-37.  
3 EU competition policy is driven by many, sometimes clashing, objectives such as economic welfare, promoting market integration, 
economic freedom, fairness and other public policy considerations. For a comprehensive debate on the EU competition policy objectives, see 
eg M Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 2004), 17-30. A Jones and B Sufrin, EC Competition Law (OUP Oxford, 




The article is structured as follows. In section A we introduce the reader to the existing methods of 
congestion management. This is followed by a brief description of the main facts of the SvK case. Then, in 
section B, we take a closer look at the antitrust investigation itself, particularly at the choice of the legal basis 
and the procedure. We explain how the Commission employs competition rules to promote market integration 
and what impact may it have on the outcome of the case. We turn to the other tools in section C, where we 
discuss the Nordic debate on market splitting, and in section D, we cover the EU sector-specific regulation of 
congestion management. Section E draws certain conclusions. 
 
A. THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT 
 
Network operators handle transmission congestion on their national power grids generally in three ways, 
that is, by 1) market splitting, 2) congestion shifting and 3) counter-trading.
4
 These three common congestion 
management methods can be combined. 
Firstly, in the day-ahead market
5
, a network operator can split the market at the network bottleneck point 
and create one price zone (price area) on each side of the bottleneck. Once the day-ahead market closes, day-
ahead prices differ in both areas.
6
 The area of abundant electricity supply (surplus area) gets a lower electricity 
price than the area on the other side of the bottleneck (deficit area), where electricity is expensive. In this way, 
congestion between the two zones is resolved by adjusting zonal prices, influencing zonal supply and demand. 
Zonal day-ahead price differences vary over time, depending on the local electricity demand and supply 
conditions. At times without congestion, prices in both areas even up, so that there is only one common day-
ahead price for all the market.
7
 Until recently, only Italy, Denmark, Norway and the UK had multiple price zones 
to deal with national congestion.
8
 Most European countries constitute single price areas, that is, the country’s 
borders coincide with those of a price zone.
9
 
Secondly, still in the day-ahead market, the network operator can reduce trading capacities with 
neighbouring countries. For instance, it can reduce export from a deficit area within a country, as this will reduce 
demand for transmission capacity on the national transmission network. In our case, reduced export of electricity 
from South Sweden to Denmark would relieve congestion on the internal bottlenecks within Sweden. This 
                                                          
4 Investment in the network (new transmission lines) would increase its physical transmission capability and hence, relieve congestion in the 
long run. In the short run, another method to deal with congestion is to perform an intended power outage in area of high consumption 
(rolling blackout or load shedding). Since this method leaves some customers without electricity, it should be considered a measure of last 
resort. In fact, TSOs allow for load shedding only in emergency situations to avoid total system blackout. See eg Nordic Competition 
Authorities, Capacity for Competition. Investing for an Efficient Nordic Electricity Market (Report 1/2007), 35-37.  
5 Elspot, the main platform for trading electricity in the Nordic region, is organised as a day-ahead auction. Elspot is the market for electricity 
to be delivered the following day, or, to be more specific, the auction for electricity 24 hours in advance of actual delivery in a given time in 
any day. Power generators offer electricity on this auction based on their ability to produce energy for a specific period on the following day. 
6 Day-ahead market closes (or “clears”) after all the day-ahead supply and demand bids have been collected and a common day-ahead 
electricity price has been calculated for all the market on the basis of all supply and demand bids. This price is called market-clearing price 
(or “system price”). If, due to congestion, market is split into price zones, market-clearing price is set for each zone separately, based on the 
supply and demand bids in that zone only.  
7 Note that two adjacent price zones might have identical prices if the line connecting the zones is not congested. Therefore, price zones are 
sometimes also called “bidding zones” which reflects more accurately the situation where prices are equal.  
8 Denmark has 2 price areas since there is no direct electricity connection between Denmark West and Denmark East. Norway splits into 2 to 
4 price areas, depending on the need. Italian day-ahead market is zonal too, structured in 22 zones. However, while generators are paid at 
zonal prices, final consumers still face a single electricity price, which is an average of all zonal sale prices weighted by the zonal 
consumptions (so-called “prezzo unico nazionale”, PUN). Sweden has introduced four price zones in November 2011, as a result of the 
Swedish Interconnectors case.  
9 There are 3 cases where price zones extend across national borders: Germany forms one price zone together with Austria, the Czech 




practice, however, creates congestion at interconnectors, that is, cross-border transmission lines.
10
 In other 
words, the network operator “shifts” internal congestion to the borders (congestion shifting). This mechanism 
divides the market into separate price zones along national borders in order to maintain a single price within a 
country. 
Thirdly, this time in real-time,
11
 the network operator can affect production and consumption patterns of 
market participants on both sides of the congested line by taking actions on the so-called balancing market, that 
is, by counter-trading. It makes deals with individual generators and large energy consumers. For instance, it 
pays generators on the surplus side of the bottleneck to reduce their production. At the same time, generators on 
the other side of the bottleneck, in the deficit area, are paid to generate more. Alternatively, the network operator 
can also pay industry consumers to change their consumption patterns. The generation system is re-dispatched
12
, 
but the electricity price that consumers face does not change. They pay a uniform price within a country, no 
matter on which side of the bottleneck they consume electricity. Prices are only different for the counter-traded 
volumes. The cost of re-dispatching is born by the TSO. In Sweden, it is then passed on to the grid users through 
the transmission network tariff. 
From the early days of the Swedish electricity market liberalisation in 1996, keeping one single electricity 
price within the country was seen as a tool to promote (national) competition and market liquidity.
13
 The single 
price policy excluded market splitting as a method of congestion management. Instead, SvK used to solve 
internal congestion using the two remaining methods, whereby it mainly shifted congestion to the borders and 
resorted to counter-trading sporadically, only if congestion shifting alone was not sufficient to relieve internal 
bottlenecks.
14
 SvK’s congestion management based on recurring export reductions triggered protests in the 
neighbouring countries, in particular in Denmark.
15
 In 2006, Dansk Energi (DaE), a trade association for Danish 
energy companies, filed a complaint to the Commission, claiming that SvK’s capacity reductions at the Øresund 
interconnector, the line between Sweden and Denmark, caused economic losses to Danish consumers. SvK 
restricted export of cheap hydro power and Denmark needed to dispatch its own more expensive thermal 
generation units instead. Electricity day-ahead prices in Denmark increased and became more volatile. In support 
                                                          
10 By “interconnector” we mean a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between Member States and which connects the national 
transmission systems of the Member States, as set out in Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 Jul. 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003, OJ L211/15. 
11 Most electricity in the Nordic region is traded on the day-ahead market. However, in case imbalances occur after the day-ahead market 
closes, the TSO can buy or sell electricity in real-time, that is, close to delivery time, to bring the market back in balance. This is called 
regulating market, where TSO collects upward and downward regulating bids from the balance providers (flexible generators). Since 1999 
there is an additional market in Sweden (Elbas) which operates after day-ahead market.  
12 The dispatch is a set of start-up, shutdown and production decisions of all individual generating plants in order to meet total demand. The 
dispatch is submitted to the network operator after the closure of the day-ahead market. When the production decisions are changed in real-
time, then the system is re-dispatched.  
13 See section B.4(c) below. 
14 According to SvK, counter-trading could not be relied upon all the time, as it required flexibility in generation and some areas lacked such 
suitable power plants to adjust production levels at a later stage. On the top of that, the Swedish TSO argued that counter-trading was not a 
suitable method to deal with congestion because its cost was borne by the Swedish grid users, and not by those who benefit from counter-
trading, for instance Denmark. For these reasons, counter-trading was considered a complementary method in the Swedish congestion 
management. SvK used it merely to correct the flow of electricity, so that it does not exceed security limits, rather than to deal with internal 
congestion (for instance, when there was still some internal congestion which could not be entirely relieved by capacity reductions at the 
borders or, in case of unexpected outages or forecast errors, to guarantee capacities declared before the market clearing). Swedish 
Interconnectors – COMP CASE NO 39351: Background explanations, supra n 39, 24 and 27. See also Energy Markets Inspectorate’s 
national reports: The Swedish electricity and natural gas markets 2009 (EI R2010:12), 14. The Swedish electricity and natural gas markets 
2010 (EI R 2011:09), 18. 
15 Complaints came also from Norway. See the letter from the Norwegian Electricity Industry Association to the European Commission of 27 




of its case, the trade association cited an empirical study of Copenhagen Economics. The consultants estimated 
the loss for the Danes from SvK’s cross-border capacity reductions and gains for the Swedes resulting from the 
lower domestic prices.
16
 According to DaE, the Swedish congestion shifting was detrimental to competition and 
trade within the internal market and violated EU competition rules.
17
 The complaint was backed by EBL, the 
Norwegian Electricity Industry Association, due to effects of SvK’s likewise reduction of interconnector 
capacity at the Swedish-Norwegian border. 
In April 2009, the Commission opened proceedings against SvK for an abuse of a dominant position on the 




 According to the Commission, SvK might 
have violated competition rules by limiting cross-border transmission capacity in order to relieve internal 
congestion in the Swedish network.
20
 A few months later in September, as a result of negotiations with the 
Commission, SvK voluntarily entered into a settlement and offered a set of commitments. Most importantly, 
SvK agreed to split the Swedish market into four price zones by November 2011.
21
 SvK committed to solve 
internal congestion by adjusting zonal prices, affecting zonal supply and demand within Sweden, and not by 
shifting congestion to the borders. In cases, where internal congestion occurs within a price zone, SvK offered 
not to reduce capacity on the interconnectors, but carry out counter-trading within these zones to relieve it. 
Secondly, as an interim remedy, before the system of separate price areas becomes operative (within 18 months), 
SvK agreed to reduce the transmission flow on internal bottlenecks primarily by counter-trading, and not, as far 




B. INTERNAL MARKET OBJECTIVE REACHED WITH COMPETITION POLICY 
 
In this section we argue that the SvK case is marked with two conflicting goals of EU competition policy: 
promotion of market integration (which we label “internal market objective”) and improving economic welfare 
(the “market efficiency objective”).
23
 On the one hand, the market integration objective implies that any obstacle 
to cross-border trade should be removed. On the other hand, the market efficiency objective requires that 
                                                          
16 According to their estimations, Danish consumers suffered a loss of DKK 725 million (EUR 97.3 million) arising from higher spot prices 
(the cost of price volatility has not been quantified). The gain (avoided costs) passed on to Swedish consumers was DKK 215-265 million 
(EUR 29-35 million). See Copenhagen Economics, The economic consequences of capacity limitations on the Øresund connection (Report 
of 11 December 2006, Copenhagen), commissioned by Energinet.dk, the Danish network operator. 
17 DaE challenged the SvK’s policy on several legal bases, namely the internal market rules on free movement of goods (Articles 34 and 35 
TFEU), the provisions of the 2nd Energy Package (Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, OJ L176/1, and Directive 2003/54/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of  26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC, OJ L176, 37-56) and finally, also the EU competition rules (Article 102 TFEU). The full text of the complaint is available at 
http://www.danskenergi.dk/Aktuelt/Indblik/Svenska_Kraftnaet.aspx accessed on 1 November 2012. 
18 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C115/47. 
19 Case COMP/39.351 – Swedish Interconnectors. See Commission Decision, supra n 2. 
20 DaE’s complaint concerned only the Øresund interconnector. However, the Commission broadened the scope of its investigation, 
including all interconnectors managed by SvK. Commission Decision, supra n 2, 38-40. 
21 Initially, it was agreed with the Commission that the exact number of price zones and their configuration was flexible, depending on the 
flow patterns in the Swedish electricity network. SvK decided to introduce four new zones. 
22 Market splitting does not apply to the west-coast corridor, due to the lack of sufficient suitable generation resources for setting a market 
price in that area. For the same technical reasons counter-trading cannot be performed there. Instead, SvK undertook to reinforce the west-
coast corridor by building and operating a new 400kV transmission line by the end of November 2011. See Commission Decision, supra n 2, 
14, para 48. 





congestion should be solved efficiently, so that it does not deteriorate economic welfare. This means that cross-
border trade should be increased only if social benefits of such a policy outweigh social costs.  
In our view, the Commission does not distinguish between these two conflicting goals in the SvK case. Its 
arguments are mainly based on internal market rhetoric and neglect a substantial economic analysis. The focus 
on the internal market objective rules out, from the outset, any possible objective justification of SvK’s approach 
to congestion management before the Commission’s investigation. We deal with these issues in detail in 
subsections B.3 and B.4 and follow up with a discussion on proportionality of SvK’s commitments in section 
B.5. However, before doing this, we make the reader familiar with the political climate and legal concerns, 
which the Commission might have faced when launching this case (B.1), and the specific procedure it opted for 
(B.2). 
1. Political climate and legal concerns likely delayed the case  
The Commission opened antitrust proceedings against SvK almost three years after the Danish complaint. 
This might reflect the initial reluctance of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) 
to take up this case.
24
 We can only speculate on the political and legal reasons for this delay. 
(a) Political climate 
One of the main objectives of the Commission in 2006-2008 was to push for further unbundling of the 
transmission network operators. This was a core element of the Commission’s legislative proposal for internal 




 The Commission argued that a complete separation of 
transmission business would eliminate all anticompetitive concerns regarding the transmission segment. In line 
with the Commission’s unbundling policy, DG COMP mostly took on cases against vertically integrated 
companies, which owned both transmission and supply businesses.
26
 Launching a competition case against SvK, 
an already unbundled network operator, would not necessarily be consistent with the Commission’s rhetoric set 
out during the adoption of the 3
rd
 Energy Package. Once the 3
rd
 Package was adopted in spring 2009, the 
Commission immediately went ahead to open formal proceedings against SvK.
27
 In fact, the Commission clearly 
                                                          
24 DaE submitted its complaint on SvK’s congestion management in July 2006. A competition case was opened in April 2009. The 
Commission’s inaction is not unusual but it stands in stark contrast to the principle of good administration. According to the case law, the 
Commission must adopt a decision regarding the action it intends to take within a reasonable time (Judgment of the Court of 18 March 1997 
in case C-282/95 P: Guérin Automobiles v. Commission [1997] ECR I-1503, point 37). For instance, an indicative time limit for informing 
the complaint of the Commission’s proposed action is four months. See Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the 
Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 27 April 2004, OJ C101/65, points 60-63. 
25 The package consists of two Directives and three Regulations (Directive 2009/73/EC of  the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L211/94; Directive 
2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L211/55/EC; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005, OJ L211/36; 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, OJ L211/15; Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, OJ L211/1). The 
package was adopted in July 2009 and is applicable since 2011. 
26 See cases COMP/39.389 – German electricity balancing market, COMP/39.402 – RWE gas foreclosure, COMP/39.316 – GDF Suez gas 
foreclosure, COMP/39.317 – E.ON gas foreclosure, COMP/39.315 – ENI. See also A Hauteclocque, F Marty and J Pillot, “The Essential 
Facilities Doctrine in European Competition Policy: The Case of Energy Sector”, in JM Glachant, D Finon and A Hautecloque (eds), 
Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets: A New Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2011), 259-293. 
27 The third package received a formal approval from the European Parliament in April 2009 (see IP/09/622, 22 April 2009). In the same 




saw an opportunity in the case to send a clear message to newly unbundled network operators to respect common 
market goals when managing congestion on their national grids.
28
 
Moreover, there might have been concerns that this case would bring competition law into the realm of 
energy policy and sector-specific regulation, since SvK is a state-owned and regulated public utility. This might 
have signalled a substantial erosion of the competencies of the Swedish state. However, if such concerns ever did 
exist, then they lost importance in 2008, when the European Courts ruled in two important Article 102 cases. 
Both cases concerned regulated sectors, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals. In the first case, the General 
Court upheld a fine imposed by the Commission on Deutsche Telekom (DT) for margin squeeze. The German 
case was widely contested because the Commission intervened under competition rules even though the DT’s 
pricing policy was permitted by the national regulator.
29
 The second case, known as Syfait II case, concerned a 
Greek subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) took the stance that GSK’s 
refusal to supply with the clear intention to restrict export from Greece violated Article 102 TFEU. The Court 
found no objective considerations that could justify this behaviour, and ignored the fact that both prices and 
distribution of pharmaceuticals are subject to extensive regulation in all Member States.
30
 Taken together, in 
2008 the Courts not only gave a clear nod for the Commission’s antitrust activity in the regulated markets (DT 
case, Syfait II case), but also endorsed the Commission’s pursuing of an internal market objective through 
competition rules (Syfait II case). 
The fact that Sweden took over the EU presidency in 2009 might have contributed to the quick 
implementation of the case as well. It is believed that Sweden did not want the case lingering around much 
longer, as it could undermine the success of its presidency. Lastly, given the already vigorous EU antitrust  
enforcement in the energy sector, the case seemed to fit well with Commissioner Kroes’ priorities.   
(b) Legal concerns 
The SvK case could have been tackled under competition rules, internal market rules or sector-specific energy 
rules. Depending on that, the case could have been allocated either to DG COMP, DG MARKT or DG ENER.
31
 
The Commission’s inaction at the outset might reflect the indecision as to which DG should take this case. As 
for DG COMP, it might have been unclear whether Article 102 TFEU could constitute a correct legal basis to 
                                                          
28 P Chauve and others, “Swedish Interconnector case. Improving electricity cross-border trade” (2010) 2 Competition Policy Newsletter, 3 
and 5 in fine. See also comments of Commissioner Joaquín Almunia in press release of 14 April 2011, IP/10/425. Using cross-border 
capacity limitations to relieve internal bottlenecks is a common practice of all national TSOs, even to a much larger degree than SvK. See, 
for instance, Copenhagen Economics, supra n 16, 7.  
29 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 10 April 2008 in case T-271/03 – Deutsche Telekom AG. v. Commission, paras 85-89. Deutsche 
Telekom’s appeal to the ECJ was dismissed in 2010. The ECJ upheld the General Court’s judgment and confirmed that Article 101 and 102 
TFEU do not apply to undertakings in cases when the national regulatory framework requires them to engage in an anti-competitive conduct 
or when it eliminates any possibility for the undertakings to comply with competition rules. However, if national legislation merely 
encourages or makes it easier for undertakings to act autonomously in an abusive manner, but leaves open the possibility of complying with 
competition rules, this does not absolve them from responsibility under Article 101 and 102 TFEU. See Judgment of the Court of 14 October 
2010 in case C-280/08 P –  Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, paras 80-82. 
30 This case was a follow-up to Syfait I case, where Advocate General Jacobs considered in his opinion that GSK’s refusal to supply can be 
objectively justified given, among others, “the pervasive regulation of price and distribution in the European pharmaceuticals sector.” 
Despite that, the Court in 2008 found no justification to GSK’s anticompetitive practices. The outcome of this case was hotly debated. See 
Judgment of the Court of 16 September 2008 in joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline 
AEVE (Syfait II) [2008] ECR I-7139; Opinion of AG Jacobs of 28 October 2004 in case C-53/03 Syfait and Others v GlaxoSmithKline plc 
(Syfait I) [2005] ECR I-4609. 
31 DG COMP – Directorate General for Competition; DG MARKT – The Internal Market and Services Directorate-General; DG ENER – 
The Directorate-General for Energy. As a matter of fact, DaE complained both to DG ENER and DG COMP, arguing that SvK’s practices 
violated internal market rules as well as competition rules. Given the possibility of various legal routes, discussions on case allocation might 




deal with this case. The Swedish network operator is an integral part of the public administration and has no 
legal personality on its own. It therefore remains under the state’s control to some extent. Such close links with 
the state raise a question of liability: should SvK be responsible for the choice of congestion management 
method (and be subject to competition rules) or should it be the Swedish state (which failed to comply with the 
EU law)? Apart of an action under competition rules, the Commission could have also started proceedings 
against Sweden under Article 258 TFEU for failing to comply with the EU law (action for non-compliance). The 
Treaty offers a range of provisions which could serve here as a legal basis for the Commission’s action through 
DG MARKT. These could be the internal market provisions on free movement of goods (Article 35 TFEU), the 
principle of non-discrimination (Article 18 TFEU), or even antitrust rules (Article 4(3) TFEU in combination 
with Article 102 TFEU). Action for non-compliance can also be based on secondary, sector-specific EU 
regulation, which would allocate the case to DG ENER. Cross-border trade in electricity was at that time 
regulated in a directly applicable legislative act – Regulation (EC) 1228/2003.
32
 Rules on congestion 
management were appended to the regulation, taking the form of binding guidelines.
33
 In fact, the Commission 
(2007) was plainspoken about its plans to start infringement procedures against Member States for not 
complying with the internal market rules on congestion management.
34
 The first wave of infringement 
proceedings started almost in parallel to the SvK investigation and focused on the lack of transparent access to 
interconnectors in all Member States.
35
 The Commission closed proceedings in six cases within one year, but the 
remaining 19 Member States (incl. Sweden) have been again requested in 2010 to comply with the EU internal 
market rules, also in the area of congestion management.
36
 Alternatively, the Commission could have adopted an 
Article 106 TFEU decision (in combination with Article 102 TFEU) for maintaining in force measures which 
allow or facilitate congestion shifting by SvK. The Commission relied on Article 106 in 2008, when it took an 
action in the energy sector against Greece.
37
 Since the Greek case also involved an abuse of a dominant position 
(Article 106 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU) the assessment of SvK’s behaviour under 
antitrust rules would seem to be less of an experiment. 
However, after investigating the case, the Commission established that SvK acts independently from the 
Swedish state in the area of congestion management.
38
 SvK itself underlined its decisional autonomy as a 
completely unbundled TSO.
39
 Nor did it ever argue that its conduct was required by state regulation.
40
 In sum, 
                                                          
32 Supra n 17. Now it is regulated in Regulation (EC) 714/2009, supra n 25, which repealed Regulation (EC) 1228/2003. 
33 Guidelines on the Management and Allocation of Available Transfer Capacity on Interconnectors between National Systems (CM 
Guidelines), annexed to Regulation (EC) 1228/2003, supra n 17, and now to Regulation (EC) 714/2009, supra n 25. These are binding 
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of the Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 “Regulation on Cross-border Exchanges in Electricity” (COM(2007) 250 final, 15 May 2007), 5. 
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36 IP/10/836 and MEMO/10/275, 24.06.2010. 
37 Case COMP/B-1/38.700 – Greek lignite. The Greek case also involved a public undertaking vested with legal monopoly for access to 
lignite exploration. The Commission used Article 102 in conjunction with Article 106(3) TFEU to induce Greece to remove the existing 
barriers to the lignite market and lignite-fueled electricity production. 
38 Commission Decision, supra n 2, point 22. 
39 Swedish Interconnectors – COMP CASE NO 39351: Background explanations submitted by Svenska Kraftnät regarding the offered 
commitments for this case, 356/2006/MA30, October 1, 2009, available at  
http://www.svk.se/Global/02_Press_Info/091001_Background_document.pdf  accessed on 1 November 2012, 6-7. 
40 So-called “regulated conduct defence”. This concept describes a specific type of defence, which excludes the intervention under 
competition rules in cases when an abuse of dominance by an undertaking is required by national legislation and the undertaking in question 
has no discretion to act differently. The mere existence of regulation which encourages or facilitates abusive conduct does not exempt from 




SvK’s statements endorsed the Commission’s approach. This eventually might have excluded an action against 
Sweden under Article 258 TFEU, or an eventual Article 106 decision, and might have prompted the Commission 
to fall back on antitrust rules as a legal basis. 
2. Commitment procedure simplifies the case 
In contrast to these initial obstacles, formal proceedings against SvK, once opened, advanced quite quickly 
and the Commission closed the case within one year. As in most of its previous antitrust actions in the energy 
sector, the Commission decided to settle the case under the commitment procedure, set forth in Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003.
41
 This is a simplified procedure by which the Commission formulates its concerns about an 
alleged breach of antitrust rules in a document called preliminary assessment. The investigation is much quicker 
than one done under the standard infringement procedure (Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003). However, this 
administrative efficiency comes at the expense of analytical depth. For the purpose of a commitment decision, 
the Commission is not required to find an infringement of competition rules. Neither a dominant position, nor its 
abuse needs to be established. In turn, much more attention is paid to the remedies. The undertaking in question 
offers a package of remedies (i.e. commitments) to address the Commission’s concerns formulated in the 
preliminary assessment. If the Commission considers them sufficient to remedy the anticompetitive behaviour, it 
makes them binding upon the undertaking in a commitment decision and settles the case without concluding on 
whether there was (or still is) a breach of competition rules. Instead, it concludes that there are no longer grounds 
for its action. In practice, the final commitment package is the outcome of negotiations between the Commission 
and the undertaking.  
We observe that Article 9 settlements greatly facilitate the use of competition rules as an EU industrial 
policy tool. The Commission pursues policies of economic liberalisation and integration of markets, which often 
interfere with national protectionism or interests of local industrial lobby groups. Where political negotiations 
collapse due to irreconcilable national or industrial aims, direct negotiations with firms under competition rules 
allow the Commission to achieve its policy goals while keeping national governments and interest groups out of 
the picture. The loose concept of concerns in Article 9 allows the Commission to extend the scope of 
competition policy to catch practices, which may hamper European integration, but where antitrust aspects may 
not always be that obvious. Moreover, because an infringement of competition rules does not need to be 
established in a settlement, the Commission does not really need to come up with a robust theory of 
anticompetitive harm based on sound economic principles.
42
 It appears that, in the process of modernization of 
EU competition rules, where a more economic approach displaces formalism and requires an effect-based 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
n 29, points 85-89 and 311. A De Streel, Background Paper, prepared for the OECD, Competition Policy Roundtable on Regulated Conduct 
Defence (DAF/COMP(2011)3). See also submission from the European Union. 
41 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 
82 of the Treaty, OJ L1, 4 January 2003, 1-25. Nine out of fourteen antitrust investigation launched in the aftermath of the energy sector 
inquiry were closed with a commitment decision: Commission Decision of 11 October 2007 in case COMP/37.966 – Distrigaz (this 
investigation was running in parallel to the sector inquiry). Commission Decision of 5 March 2008 and Commission Decision of 4 August 
2009 in case COMP/38.700 – Greek lignite and electricity markets (Article 106(3) in connection with Article 102 TFEU). Commission 
Decision of 26 November 2008 in case COMP/39.388 – German electricity wholesale market. Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 
in case COMP/39.389 – German electricity balancing market. Commission Decision of 18 March 2009 in case COMP/39.402 – RWE gas 
foreclosure. Commission Decision of 3 December 2009 in case COMP/39.316 – GDF foreclosure. Commission Decision of 17 March 2010 
in case COMP/39.386 - Long term electricity contracts in France. Commission Decision of 4 May 2010 in case COMP/39.317 – E.ON gas 
foreclosure. Commission Decision of 29 September 2010 in case COMP/39.315 – ENI.  
42 The settlements might also have clear advantages for the firms involved. They will be able to avoid a lengthy and costly process, they 




assessment of anticompetitive behaviour, commitment procedure provides an escape hatch, where the 
Commission can drop economic welfare standards and pursue other policy objectives. In the following sections, 
using the SvK case as an example, we explain how the Commission employs competition rules to promote 
market integration, and ignores possible efficiencies of SvK’s actions as well as the regulatory context of 
electricity transmission services. 
3. Promotion of market integration as a key objective in the SvK case 
According to the Commission, SvK may have abused its dominant position on the market for electricity 
transmission in Sweden, and thus infringed Article 102 TFEU, by limiting export capacity on the interconnectors 
in order to relieve congestion on the national grid. To breach Article 102 TFEU, SvK would have to meet the 
following five cumulative conditions set forth therein: it would have to be (1) an undertaking (2) which abuses 
its (3) dominant position (4) held within the internal market or a substantial part of it, and (5) this behaviour 
would have to affect inter-State trade.
43
 For the purpose of adopting a commitment decision, a breach of Article 
102 TFEU does not need to be established, which allows the Commission to only briefly discuss the five-step 
infringement test.  
As already mentioned in B.1(b), it was debatable whether SvK could be considered an undertaking for the 
purpose of Article 102 TFEU (the first
 
element). The classification of SvK as an undertaking in the meaning of 
EU competition rules is of key importance as it determines whether Article 102 TFEU can be applied here in the 
first place. The Commission establishes in the decision that SvK is subject to competition laws. The discussion 
concerning criteria (3), (4) and (5) seems to be more of a formality. Finding a dominant position within a 
substantial part of the internal market (3 and 4) is in any case evident, as SvK enjoys a legal monopoly for the 
transmission services in Sweden.
44
 Similarly, since the case concerns cross-border trade in energy, the inter-State 
effect (5) is beyond dispute.
45
 
The core of the Commission’s assessment is the (alleged) abuse itself (2). The Commission develops a 
theory of harm which intertwines anticompetitive concerns (discrimination) with an internal market interest. 
Firstly, one source of anticompetitive concern is that SvK’s practices led to de facto discrimination between 
different network users. SvK discriminated on the basis of nationality, since at times of congestion it only 
refused to satisfy external demand, whereas transmission of electricity reserved for national consumption has 
never been limited in order to relieve internal bottlenecks. The Commission explicitly refers to the general 
principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the Treaty,
46
 and recalls that nationality-based discrimination can 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of Article 102 TFEU. In fact, the European Courts used to 
apply Article 102 TFEU to discriminatory practices in the past and the Commission invokes this line of cases to 
back the SvK decision.
47
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46 Article 18 TFEU. 
47 Case C-82/01 Aéroports de Paris v Commission [2002] ECR I-9297, case C-163/99 Portuguese Republic v Commission [2001] ECR I-
2613, case T-139/98 AAMS v Commission [2001] ECR II-3413, case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia [1994] ECR I-1783, case 7/82 GVL v 
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Secondly, and this is where the internal market rules come into picture, the Commission reasons that SvK’s 
practices contributed to a re-segmentation of the European market along national borders, with artificially low 
prices in Sweden and higher prices abroad. Hence, the non-Swedish customers could not fully benefit from the 
internal market.
48
 SvK’s policy constituted an obstacle to trade within the internal market. The Commission 
recalls that Article 35 TFEU prohibits quantitative restrictions on exports and measures having equivalent 
effect.
49
 It refers to the ECJ case law dating all the way back to the 1966 Consten and Grundig judgment
50
 and 
draws an analogy between SvK’s conduct and state measures restricting cross-border trade. According to the 
Commission, since export restrictions are prohibited under the Treaty, so should be a unilateral conduct of a 
dominant undertaking with the same objective of restricting cross-border trade.
51
 
The Commission’s theory of harm heavily relies on the general prohibition of nationality-based 
discrimination and Article 35 TFEU. These are provisions contextually beyond the scope of competition 
policy,
52
 but the Commission has invoked them directly or indirectly in competition cases whenever it sought to 
protect the internal market or promote further market integration.
53
 The case law recalled by the Commission 
considers market-partitioning practices as per se abuses, because they frustrate “the most fundamental objections 
of the Union”
54
, and because they have the same objective as protectionist measures by Member States, which 
are captured by internal market rules. The Commission does not depart from this argumentation in the SvK case. 
Its approach remains very formalistic. First, it emphasizes discriminatory nature of SvK’s practices, based solely 
on price comparisons in the day-ahead market. In a companion article we show that this approach lacks 
economic foundations.
55
 Then, it refers to the Consten and Grundig reasoning and concludes that “practices, 
[which aim at restricting exports of electricity so as to reserve such electricity for domestic consumption], are 
generally considered to have as their object the restriction of competition”. Put differently, the Commission 
seems to apply in the SvK case a per se rule, according to which congestion shifting by SvK is abusive as such 
and cannot be justified on economic welfare standards. 
4. Neglecting objective justification 
In this subsection we discuss whether SvK’s congestion shifting could be justified on legitimate grounds, a 
question which, in our assessment, did not receive sufficient attention by the Commission. The Commission 
considers SvK’s action an impediment to cross-border trade, and this implies that congestion shifting is abusive 
per se. However, we are convinced that a more relaxed procedural framework of an Article 9 settlement could 
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50 Judgment of the Court of 13 July 1966 in joined cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 
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55 M Sadowska and B Willems, “Market Integration and Economic Efficiency at Conflict? Commitments in the Swedish Interconnectors 




have given room for objective justifications (B.4(a)) such as the ones put forward by SvK: that the action was 
justified based on efficiency improvements (B.4(b)) and the public interest (B.4(c)). 
(a) Objective justification and commitment procedure 
The reasoning set out in the preliminary assessment suggests that if the Commission was in fact required by 
the procedure to find an infringement of Article 102 TFEU (which is not required in a commitment procedure), 
then it would consider SvK’s practice as a per se abuse. That is, congestion shifting would be presumed 
unlawful, without allowing evidence to the contrary, by way of justification.  
In theory, there are no per se abuses under Article 102 TFEU.
56
 As is often reiterated by the ECJ, 
anticompetitive practices of a dominant undertaking are abusive unless they are objectively justified.
57
 The 
notion of objective justification developed by the Courts is far from clear, as neither the Commission, nor the 
ECJ has been consistent in its interpretation.
58
 However, the right of a dominant undertaking to defend itself 
against allegations of abuse on the basis of objective justification is not questioned.
59
 Objective justification is 
thus a defence under competition rules and, as acknowledged by the Courts and the Commission, it captures 
practices pursuing legitimate public interest objectives as well as those producing efficiency gains.
60
 
A standard infringement procedure under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 requires the Commission to 
investigate the case thoroughly and to adopt a statement of objections, which triggers clear procedural rights for 
the undertaking to defend its conduct against the objections raised therein.
61
 In other words, once the 
Commission finds an abuse, the burden of proof shifts to the undertaking, which can try to justify its practices.
 
  
However, the SvK case was settled. In an Article 9 settlement the Commission does not issue a statement of 
objections, but only formulates its concerns in a preliminary assessment. The purpose and content of those 
documents differ. A preliminary assessment serves an undertaking subject to proceedings as a basis to formulate 
appropriate commitments, and not to exercise its right of defence. For this purpose, it merely includes the 
Commission’s anticompetitive concerns, and not formal objections.
62
 A statement of objections is a more 
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60 See Jones and Sufrin, supra n 3, 282. Whish, supra n 3, 207.  
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62 Ibid, points 121 and 122. 
63 Ibid, points 82 and 123. For a short comparison, see also M Kellerbauer, “Playground instead of playpen: The Court of Justice of the 




Comparing the two procedural routes (Article 9 settlements and Article 7 infringement procedure) we 
believe there is a risk that the objective justification defence is not sufficiently taken into account in the 
settlement procedure. Formally, the commitment procedure does not give the undertaking any procedural right to 
rebut the concerns of the Commission, and in a settlement the dialectic debate is replaced by bargaining over 
commitments, which might make it more difficult for an undertaking to argue in defence of its actions, and 
easier for the Commission to disregard them.  
This is also apparent from the publicly available case documents, where SvK argues in favour of its 
congestion management methods both in reply to the DaE’s complaint, as well as during the settlement 
negotiations with the Commission.
64
 Its argumentation is based on both efficiency considerations and public 
interest objectives (as discussed in B.4(b) and B.4(c) below). The Commission, however, does not take note of 
this argumentation and only remarks in its decision that SvK did not provide sufficient evidence to objectively 
justify its conduct.
65
 Hence, the administrative efficiency feature of the commitment procedure appears to 
absolve the Commission from taking a closer look at the possible reasons for the allegedly abusive conduct.  
It is difficult to predict whether the Swedish TSO would have been more successful in justifying its actions 
under a standard infringement procedure. Objective justification under Article 102 TFEU is rarely accepted in 
practice, both by the Commission and the Courts.
66
 And even though the Regulation 1/2003 and the 
Commission’s notice on best practices
67
 are silent as to the possibility of using objective justification in the 
context of a settlement, this does not mean that an undertaking cannot justify its allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct on objective grounds to strengthen its bargaining position in the negotiations.
68
 Thus, having this 
indirect role in the negotiations, objective justification can still influence the outcome of the case.
69
  
In what follows, we discuss the two arguments used by SvK to defend its congestion management. We 
believe that the Commission failed to analyse these arguments on their merits. However, we do not want to 
enquire into whether or not it makes sense for the Commission to assume a more pro-active approach in Article 9 
settlements.
70
 Rather, we would like to point out that an electricity network is a complex techno-economic 
system, where a lot of trade-offs need to be made almost on a continuous basis. A better analysis of this system, 
and its regulation, could have lead to an enhanced definition of the abuse, and as a result, would have given more 
guidance for network operators and sector-specific regulators.  
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(2010) 1 Journal of Competition Law & Practice 3, 175. 
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provide any strong evidence in support of its anticompetitive allegations. 
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(b) Objective justification based on efficiencies 
SvK maintained that it shifted congestion to the border and preferred not to rely on counter-trading as its 
cost would be absorbed by the Swedish grid users, and not by those, who benefit from it (i.e. Denmark). SvK 
argued that it proposed the Danish TSO to share the financial burden of increased counter-trading on several 
occasions, but its offers were declined.
71
 
This argument makes some economic sense. Danish consumption creates a negative externality:
72
 it reduces 
availability of transmission capacity within Sweden. The same applies to the Swedish consumers. If SvK shifts 
too much of its internal congestion to the border to increase Swedish consumption, it has a negative impact on 
the Danes, reducing cross-border capacity and thus increasing the cost of energy consumption in Denmark. In 
our companion article
73
 we show that SvK can achieve efficient allocation by shifting some internal congestion 
to the border and counter-trading the rest. The optimal amount of congestion shifting depends on the demand 
levels in Sweden and in Denmark. In social optimum, the electricity day-ahead price in Denmark should be equal 
to the counter-trading price in South Sweden. Paying this price for their energy consumption, Danish consumers 
would internalise the cost of congestion they create within Sweden. Still, this does not mean that Denmark 
should pay a share of the Swedish counter-trading costs, a principle that SvK puts forward. This is because 
counter-trading costs are not related to the social cost of congestion.
74
 As a result of counter-trading, consumers 
in South Sweden and producers in North Sweden receive implicit subsidies. Consumers in the south pay a lower 
day-ahead price than when congestion is priced directly in the day-ahead market, as in the case of market 
splitting. Similarly, producers in the north receive a higher day-ahead price. Those subsidies consist mainly of 
transfers from the Swedish network operator to the Swedish network users, and are therefore not a measure of 
the social cost of congestion, which the Danes would have to pay in order to internalise their negative 
externality. 
In summary, we show that SvK could have had an efficiency objective in mind, when it shifted some of the 
internal congestion to the border with Denmark. The Commission’s cursory assessment of SvK’s behaviour does 
not consider this possibility. Instead, the Commission compares day-ahead prices in Denmark and Sweden and 
concludes that SvK’s practices are discriminatory and lead to market-partitioning. In our companion article we 
show that the difference in day-ahead prices should not be taken as an indicator for discriminatory behaviour. 
One would rather need to compare the marginal counter-trading cost in South Sweden with the day-ahead price 
in Denmark.
75
 A more economic approach to the concept of discrimination would not lead to an outright 
prohibition of congestion shifting in the first place, and would have given SvK the opportunity to justify its 
actions on efficiency grounds.  
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(c) Objective justification based on public interest 76 
SvK argued that maintaining a common electricity market with a common price was advantageous for 
Sweden. There were genuine concerns, that splitting the market into smaller price zones would have a negative 
impact on Sweden, by reducing the liquidity in the wholesale market and hindering retail competition.
77
 
As a state-run central administrative authority SvK must act in accordance with the Instruction from the 
Swedish Government.
78
 This document, issued on a yearly basis, stipulates SvK’s guiding principles and also 
specifies special tasks. According to the Instruction, SvK should promote competition in the Swedish wholesale 
and retail electricity markets.
79
 In the light of this objective, keeping a single price might have been in line with 
the Instruction, as it is claimed to make forward and day-ahead markets more liquid and promote retail 
competition. Interestingly, Swedish government itself commissioned SvK to investigate the possibility of market 
splitting in Sweden as early as in 1993. SvK claims that similar studies, also delegated by the Swedish 
government, have been performed over the years and all of them pointed to the risk of weakening competition 
and reducing liquidity in the sub-markets.
80
 On the top of that, the Swedish stakeholders, headed by the industry 
association, Swedenergy, were from the outset fairly negative about market splitting. As SvK reports, this 
scepticism did not end with the implementation of the commitment package and criticism can still be heard.
81
  
The question arises as to whether SvK was sufficiently autonomous in setting its congestion management 
system, for instance, whether it could introduce market splitting independently from the Swedish government.
82
 
As a public utility, SvK does enjoy decisional autonomy regarding transmission services it provides – it makes 
decisions and issues regulations.
83
 Further, congestion management procedures are not specifically regulated in 
any legislative act.
84
 The Electricity Act sets out criteria on network operation, but these are very general, and 
include, for instance, the obligation to transmit electricity on reasonable conditions and of good quality.
85
 This 
all demonstrates that SvK has discretion as to whether to keep Sweden as one Elspot area or to further subdivide 
it.
86
 However, it appears that keeping one price within Sweden has always been a part of a wider socio-
geographic policy. Seen from that angle, supply of electricity at a uniform electricity price within Sweden can 
therefore be considered a ‘service of general economic interest’ in a broader socioeconomic sense.
87
 Against this 
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86 Note that the very fact that SvK offered market splitting as a commitment to the Commission in a bilateral antitrust deal proves this point. 
87 We do not refer to any specific legal definition of services of general economic interest (SGEI) under the Swedish national regulation. The 
concept of SGEI is not defined by the EU law. In EU practice, SGEI are economic activities that would not be produced by market forces 




backdrop, SvK’s decisional autonomy to introduce market splitting might have been de facto limited by the 
national policy of maintaining a common price in Sweden, widely supported by the Swedish market.  
5. Proportionality of the final remedy 
The introduction of market splitting abolishes the single uniform electricity price which is valid for all the 
Swedish customers. In other words, it imposes a social policy on Sweden, something which normally remains 
within the State’s own decision making powers. Given this far-reaching intervention in the Sweden’s social 
policy domain, we would like to address the question whether the Commission went beyond its discretionary 
powers, by extracting disproportionate commitments. 
First of all, we should note that the Commission enjoys a broad margin of assessment regarding the 
proportionality of commitments. According to the recent ECJ judgment in the Alrosa case, the principle of 
proportionality, as a general principle of EU law, applies to commitment decisions, but to a limited extent.
88
 Had 
the principle of proportionality fully applied, the Commission would have to (a) test whether the accepted 
commitments address its concerns formulated in the preliminary assessment, and, (b) consider alternative, less 
restrictive, measures (if they exist and are known to the Commission) and choose those, provided they also 
address its concerns.
89
 According to the Alrosa judgment, in a commitment procedure the second test should be 
replaced by two weaker requirements. First, (b’) the accepted commitments must be the least restrictive (for the 
undertaking concerned) of all the commitments that were offered by the undertaking and must address the 
Commission’s concerns.
90
 Second, (b’’) the accepted commitments must not go manifestly beyond what is 
necessary to address its concerns.
91
 Consequently, in a case where an undertaking offers only one set of 
commitments,
92
 test (b’) is trivially satisfied and the Commission only needs to assess whether (a) it meets its 
concerns and (b’’) is not manifestly disproportionate.
93
 
The Commission made SvK’s commitments binding in April 2010, that is, while the Alrosa case was still 
pending before the ECJ. This period was marked by uncertainty as to the content of the proportionality test 
applicable to Article 9 commitments.
94
 Given the lack of clear standards, the Commission came up with an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
new package on State aid rules for services of general economic interest (SGEI) – frequently asked questions. 20 December 2011). The 
concept of SGEI depends on Member States, which impose public service obligations on private or public undertakings (service providers) 
and define the conditions under which these obligations are carried out. Hence, it would be up for the Swedish state to decide that providing 
electricity at a uniform price within Sweden is considered a service of general economic interest. 
88 The principle of proportionality is a criterion for lawfulness of all measures adopted by Union institutions and requires that these measures 
cannot exceed what is appropriate and necessary for attaining the objective pursued, and that where there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued. See eg case 15/83R Denkavit Nederland [1984] ECR 2171, para 25; case C-331/88 Fedesa and Others [1990] ECR I-4023, para 13; 
GC judgment of 23 October 2003 in case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para 201; ECJ judgment of 
14 July 2005 in case C-180/00 Netherlands v Commission [2005] ECR I-6603, para 103. 
89 In 2007, the General Court required such a full proportionality test of commitments in the Alrosa case, but its judgment has been 
subsequently overruled by the ECJ on appeal. Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2007 in case T-170/06, Alrosa Company v. 
European Commission [2007] ECR II-02601, points 112-158. 
90 Judgment of the Court of 29 June 2010 in case C-441/07 P. European Commission v. Alrosa Company [2010] ECR I-05949, points 41 and 
61. 
91 Ibid, point 42: “Judicial review for its part relates solely to whether the Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect.” 
92 Publicly available case documents do not suggest that SvK offered alternative solutions to market splitting (eg increased counter-trading) 
so we assume this was the case. However, given the settlement negotiations are not public, we cannot take it for granted. 
93 In that way, the Commission can accept commitments under Article 9 which may go beyond the remedies it can impose in a standard 
infringement procedure under Article 7, in which case the principle of proportionality is fully applicable. See also Commission notice on best 
practices, supra n 61, 115, which, referring to the Alrosa judgment, expressly states that the commitments can go beyond what the 
Commission could impose in a standard infringement procedure.   
94 The Courts were sending out contradictory signals. On the one hand, the General Court stated in 2007 in the same case that the principle of 
proportionality applies to commitment procedure just as it applies to the infringement procedure. That is, the Commission is required to test 
whether the proposed commitments are proportionate to the alleged infringement and necessary to meet the Commission’s concerns 
formulated in the preliminary assessment. (Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 11 July 2007 in case T-170/06 Alrosa Company v 




almost four-page-long fully-fledged discussion on the proportionality of SvK’s commitments, which provides an 
insight in how the proportionality of the commitments would have been tested, if it were required by law. 
Regarding the first test (a) the Commission states that SvK will no longer need to reduce capacity on the 
interconnectors, once market splitting is introduced. The Commission argues that this sufficiently addresses 
concerns formulated in the preliminary assessment. Regarding the second test (b), the Commission finds that 
there is no other remedy which would be equally effective in meeting its concerns.
95
 Resulting price differences 
do not represent, in view of the Commission, a disproportionate burden for third parties. In this regard, the 
foreseeable price increase in some areas in Sweden is “an unavoidable consequence of the commitment which 
brings the alleged discrimination between Swedish and non-Swedish customers to an end.” Overall, the 
Commission concludes that the commitments “are sufficient to address the concerns identified [...] in its 
preliminary assessment without being disproportionate.” 
With regard to the first test, we find that market splitting does not sufficiently address the Commission’s 
concerns. It is true that SvK does not need to limit export to solve internal congestion. However, it can still do it 
in order to keep the prices in the new price areas at the same level. Indeed, in our companion article we show 
that despite market splitting, SvK can still shift congestion out of purely strategic reasons (in order to achieve 
price uniformity).
96
 Therefore market splitting alone, without sufficient monitoring, is not sufficient to address 
the Commission’s concerns. This means that, even in the light of the Alrosa judgment, the Commission might 
have breached the principle of proportionality, in the sense that the accepted commitments (market splitting) 
might not address its concerns set out in the preliminary assessment.
 97
 
As far as the second test (b) is concerned, the proportionality of market splitting depends on what the 
Commission wants to achieve in this case, that is, (A) market integration or (B) economic efficiency. The 
preliminary assessment suggests that the Commission’s objective is (A), as its concerns relate mostly to limiting 
cross-border capacities impeding market integration and not to inefficient congestion management, which would 
have been primary concern in variant (B). Had the Commission considered an efficiency standard (B) in its 
assessment, then market splitting would not have been a proportionate remedy, as a less onerous remedy was at 
hand. Again we refer here to our companion article in saying that efficient allocation can well be obtained by a 
combination of counter-trading and partial congestion shifting.
98
 For SvK, this might be a less onerous remedy 
with no implementation costs, which is equally effective to meet the Commission’s concerns regarding 
inefficient congestion management. However, it seems that the Commission does not seek an efficient outcome, 
but simply wants to eliminate congestion shifting and thus increase cross-border flows to enhance market 
integration (objective (A)). If this is the case, then market splitting is more adequate to address the Commission’s 
concerns regarding cross-border trade than any other method which involves cross-border capacity reductions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
argued for more discretion on the part of the Commission in the assessment of proportionality in the settlement cases. Her opinion from 
September 2009 was a strong signal that, on appeal, the ECJ might overturn the General Court’s judgment and grant the Commission wide 
latitude in the assessment of commitments. See Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 17 September 2009 in case C-441/07 P. European 
Commission v Alrosa Company [2010] ECR I-05949. 
95 The Commission briefly discusses network investments as an alternative, but concludes that they cannot constitute an equally effective 
remedy due to long lead times and uncertainty as to their outcome. 
96 Sadowska and Willems, supra n 55. 
97 Market splitting would also be considered a disproportionate remedy in a standard infringement procedure under Article 7 of Regulation 
1/2003 (full proportionality test) since it would still not pass test (a), that is, it could not be considered an effective means to bring the 
infringement to an end. 




C. SVK’S COMMITMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE NORDIC DEBATE 
 
In this section we discuss the political context of the SvK case. The idea of introducing market splitting in 
Sweden is not new. The Swedish government commissioned SvK to investigate the possibility of subdividing 
Sweden into smaller price zones as early as 1993. At that time it was suggested to put market splitting on hold, 
due to the lack of sufficient competition and liquidity in the Swedish electricity market.
99
 The movement was 
rather in the opposite direction, towards integration and the creation of bigger markets. This led to the 
establishment of Nord Pool in 1996, a joint Scandinavian power exchange, with a day-ahead auction for 
electricity as the main trading platform (Elspot). At the outset of Nordic integration, cross-border exchanges 
were limited. As national grids had sufficient transmission capacity to handle domestic flows, congestion within 
the Nordic countries was not an issue and countries could therefore be defined as single price zones. However, 
further integration within the Nordic market and with the European continent increased demand for transmission 
capacity on cross-border lines. Liquid and transparent market allowed well-informed market players to trade 
electricity across the borders. International transit flows increased the stress on national grids and congestion 
within the price zones (individual countries) occurred more frequently.
100
 As national congestion was managed 
by reducing cross-border capacity further Nordic integration was obstructed. As a result, national congestion 
management systems started to be widely discussed between the Nordic countries. The Swedish market splitting 
debate naturally moved to the regional level. In 2002, Nordel, a platform for cooperation between the Nordic 
transmission system operators,
101
 suggested further subdivision of the Nordic market into price areas and, among 
others, splitting Sweden into three zones. At that time, the Swedish power industry voiced its opposition against 
Nordel’s proposal. 
The problem of cross-border congestion at the Swedish-Danish border became particularly acute after 
November 2005 when Danish day-ahead prices often peaked to extremely high levels. The Danish TSO ascribed 
these price spikes to the SvK’s congestion management.
102
 In the same year the Swedish Energy Agency 
reported that SvK and the other Nordic TSOs were extensively limiting cross-border capacities to relieve internal 
congestion within their control areas.
103
 Following this report and the Danish complaints, the Swedish 
government commissioned the Energy Markets Inspectorate (EMI) to explore alternative congestion 
management methods, in particular market splitting in Sweden and the effects on competition in the Swedish and 
the Nordic electricity markets. EMI (2006) suggested splitting the market along cut 2,
104
 with a sufficient 
transitory period for the retail market to adjust, but not along cut 4 since it would substantially weaken 
competition in the area south of cut 4. EMI proposed an increased use of counter-trading for cut 4 instead, whose 
cost would be shared between the Swedish and the Danish TSOs. The sharing arrangement was motivated by the 
fact that the Danish customers would profit from increased counter-trading on cut 4, because SvK would not 
limit cross-border capacity anymore. However, the Danish TSO was reluctant to solve the problem bilaterally. 
                                                          
99 See the letter of Mikael Odenberg, supra n 64. 
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Instead, Dansk Energi, the Danish association of energy companies, reported SvK to the European Commission 
for shifting congestion to the Danish border. DaE complained that SvK’s conduct was harmful to Danish 
consumers. These allegations were based on an empirical study of Copenhagen Economics, which quantified the 
economic losses due to SvK’s congestion shifting.
105
 DaE claimed that SvK’s practices were detrimental to 
competition and trade within the internal market and violated EU competition rules.
106
 The Norwegian 
Electricity Industry Association (EBL) supported the Danish complaint. The threat of a case being taken to the 
European Commission intensified the market splitting debate in Sweden. In 2007, EMI issued a joint report on 
market splitting in Sweden, in cooperation with SvK and the Swedish power industry, the so-called POMPE 
report.
107
 The Swedish organisations considered a new price border within the Nordic market between the hydro 
power region in the North and thermal power in the South. The proposed border would not only split the 
Swedish market along cut 2, but also subdivide Finland and Norway into new price areas. With respect to 
Sweden, the POMPE report found that the price border along cut 2 would result in a more efficient utilisation of 
resources, without harming wholesale competition but with adverse effects on Swedish retail competition on a 
national basis.  
The discussion shifted to the Nordic level again with a series of reports. A report prepared for the Nordic 
Council of Ministers (NCM’s 2007 report) highlighted the need for new price areas, independent of the national 
borders.
108
 A second report (NCM’s 2008 report) emphasized the inefficiencies of congestion shifting, and 
showed that increasing the number of prices areas from seven to eleven would improve socioeconomic benefits, 
and it recommended further market splitting.
109
 The Nordic Energy Regulators (NordREG, 2/2007) reported that 
Congestion shifting constituted a common and frequent congestion management practice among all Nordic 
TSOs, not only the Swedish one,
110
 and saw this as a ground to change the Nordic price areas.
111
 The Nordic 
Competition Authorities (2007) analysed the competitiveness of the Nordic electricity market,
112
 but with respect 
to the Swedish congestion problems, they mainly referred to the results of the POMPE report.
113
 Following those 
reports, the Nordic Council of Ministers asked the national TSOs in 2010 to investigate the introduction of new 
price areas, and the Swedish government commissioned SvK to start a process to create several price zones in 
                                                          
105 Copenhagen Economics, supra n 16. 
106 Supra n 17. 
107 The Energy Markets Inspectorate, SvK, Swedenergy and the Confederation of Swedish Enerprise, Price Areas in the Electricity Market, 
EMIR 2007:02 (POMPE report), available in Swedish at http://www.elpriskollen.se/Start/Bibliotek/Rapporter-2007/Prisomraden-pa-
elmarknaden-Pompe/ accessed on 1 November 2012. 
108 Ea Energy Analyses and COWI, Steps for improved congestion management and cost allocation for transit, Report for the Nordic Council 
of Ministers, TemaNord 2007:537, April 2007, available at http://www.norden.org/da/publikationer/publikationer/2007-537 accessed on 1 
November 2012, 17. 
109 Ea Energy Analyses, Hagman Energy and COWI, Congestion Management in the Nordic Market – evaluation of different market models. 
Final Report for the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), May 2008. From an economic point of view, nodal pricing, which can be 
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110 For instance, during dry years, when electricity flows from the Southern Finland to the North, Fingrid reduces export capacity to Sweden, 
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Sweden is limited during wet years, when the surplus of electricity in the North of Finland flows to the South, again creating congestion on 
cut P1, this time in the opposite direction. Similarly, Stattnet reduces export capacities towards Sweden to protect Oslo with its high level of 
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stairway”). See NordREG (2/2007), supra n 2, 15-16 and 25; Organisation of the Nordic TSOs (Nordel), Nordic Grid Master Plan 2008, 
Mar. 2008, 28; Stattnet’s website at http://www.statnett.no/en/The-power-system/The-power-situation/Handling-of-bottlenecks-and-use-of-
Elspot-areas/ accessed on 1 November 2012. See also The Swedish Energy Agency, Hantering av begränsningar i det svenska 
överföringssystemet för el :ett nordiskt perspektiv, 2005:11 (in Swedish only). 
111 NordREG (2/2007), supra n 2, 13. 
112 Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities, supra n 4. 






 This process involved consultations with the Energy Market Inspectorate, the Competition Authority, 
Nord Pool Spot and dialogues with market participants, including generators, traders, distribution network 
operators and industrial consumers.
115
 This time, there was no outright opposition from the Swedish industry. 
However, Svedenergy, the flagship organisation of Swedish power suppliers, suggested waiting with market 
splitting until the planned investments in the Nordic grid would be finalised.
116
 Grid reinforcement would, 
according to Svedenergy, limit the need to introduce multiple price areas.
117
 At the same time, however, this 
would postpone market splitting until 2013 at the earliest. 
It appears that the Nordic debate on market splitting would sooner or later have led to a subdivision of the 
Swedish market into smaller price areas. However, the antitrust intervention by the European Commission not 
only intensified the ongoing discussions, but also most probably accelerated the introduction of price zones in 
Sweden by several years. Evidently, the progress in the market splitting debate was and would have remained 
slow, partly because other long-term solutions to internal congestion were pursued in parallel to the debate on 
market splitting (e.g. Nordel’s project of grid enforcement), and partly because many stakeholders tried to press 
their own clashing interests. Clearly, it was easier to introduce market splitting via an antitrust deal. The bilateral 
character of a settlement enabled the Commission to negotiate commitments directly with SvK, excluding 
interest groups’ interventions. Of course, any potential opponents to market splitting were given the option to 
express their concerns about the proposed commitments within a month following their official publication.
118
 
This phase, called market testing, is an obligatory part of the investigation in which the Commission consults the 
market regarding the impact of the proposed commitments. Any feedback received from the interested third 
parties has to be taken into consideration by the Commission before rendering the commitments binding upon 
the undertaking. If the opposing views expressed by the market participants convince the Commission, it may 
ask the undertaking in question to modify the commitments accordingly. However, it may also find that the 
observations received in the market test are not serious enough to reconsider the commitments. In such a case, 
the Commission quotes the opposing views of stakeholders gathered in the consultation, argues why it maintains 
its position, and accepts the commitments in their initial shape. And this is what happened in the SvK case.  
Firstly, some stakeholders questioned the adequacy of market splitting as a remedy to tackle internal 
congestion, arguing for counter-trading and grid investments instead. In response to that, the Commission 




Secondly, the stakeholders feared that market splitting would increase concentration in the Swedish 
wholesale, retail and balancing markets and, as far as South Sweden is concerned, it would lead to higher 
prices.
120
 In this respect, market participants shared the concerns of the Swedish TSO.
121
 However, in view of the 
Commission, market splitting does not increase concentration, but merely reveals the fact that the market is 
                                                          
114 Regleringsbrev för affärsverket svenska Kraftnät för 2009 (Annual Government Regulation Document for Svenska Kraftnät of 2009, 
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115 See Swedish Interconnectors – COMP CASE NO 39351: Background explanations, supra n 39, 13. 
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117 See Svedenergy, The Electricity Year 2008, 8. 
118 Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, supra n 41. 
119 Commission Decision, supra n 2, points 51-52. 
120 In the aftermath of market splitting prices in the southern areas of Sweden have indeed increased. As reported in November 2011, 
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already concentrated. The Commission quotes the NCM’s 2008 report, which recommends splitting the Nordic 
market into smaller price zones.
122
 It also refers to Norway, where retail market remained competitive despite 
subdivision of the country into Elspot areas. Regarding retail markets, it states that the costs and risks which 
market splitting poses to retailers (and thus deters entry in retail markets) can be diminished by entering into 
contracts for differences (CfD)
123
 and, in the longer run, by investing in new generation. Regarding wholesale 
and balancing markets and higher electricity prices in South Sweden, the Commission points out that market 
splitting will decrease market power and lead to price convergence between South Sweden and North Sweden 
over time, as it sends correct investments signals to the market. In answer to the fears of energy-intensive 
consumers that higher prices in South Sweden might have a negative impact on their competitiveness, the 
Commission points out that market splitting creates a level playing field for all industrial consumers in the EU, 
as price zones reflects the true market conditions. Also, it assures that the Swedish national regulation empowers 
EMI to monitor electricity prices.
124
 
Thirdly, some stakeholders proposed to postpone the implementation of the remedy package until 2013, 
claiming that an early introduction of price zones puts some of the current financial and long-term supply 
contracts at risk, as they would change their value. Other stakeholders opted for a longer delay (up to 5 years), 
until their fixed-price long-term supply contracts with final customers would expire. The Commission rebuts this 
argumentation, saying that market players in electricity sector are exposed to all kinds of risks and market 
splitting is just one example of these. It points out that in the light of the market splitting debate stakeholders 




Lastly, some stakeholders were concerned that market splitting might have a negative effect on investments 
in renewables. Namely, some investment projects in North Sweden, where the largest potential for green energy 
is located, might appear unprofitable once the energy prices go down in that area. As a result, Sweden would not 
achieve the 2020 national overall target for the 49% share of green energy in gross final consumption.
126
 This set 
of arguments was also rejected. The Commission noted that new investments in renewable generation in the 
North cannot contribute to a larger share of renewables in final consumption for 2020, because energy is mostly 




Taken together, even though many stakeholders opposed the introduction of the price zones and came up 
with various arguments against market splitting in response to the Commission’s market test, none of them 
succeeded in stopping or even delaying the implementation of the commitments.
128
 It therefore comes as no 
                                                          
122 Supra n 109. 
123 CfD is a derivative whose reference price is the difference of the system price and a certain area price. CfD are used for hedging against 
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124 Commission Decision, supra n 2, points 53-59. 
125 Commission Decision, supra n 2, points 60-69. 
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surprise that the SvK’s decision to introduce price zones triggered protests in Sweden and has been challenged 




D. EUROPEAN RULES ON CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
 
This section takes a closer look at the EU sector-specific regulation as a tool to integrate electricity markets, 
next to competition rules and political pressure. In subsection D.1 we briefly describe the existing EU rules on 
cross-border congestion management in relation with congestion shifting, and show in subsection D.2 that SvK’s 
cross-border capacity reductions do not violate EU law. Large legislative developments in the area of cross-
border congestion management are forthcoming, as explained in D.3. Although transparency and allocative 
efficiency of cross-border capacity will improve as a result, market splitting will not be imposed on Member 
States. Subsection D.4 summarises the effects of EU regulation on congestion shifting.  
1. Existing EU rules on congestion shifting 
EU laws regarding congestion management on cross-border lines have been under constant development for 
more than a decade.
130
 For the purpose of our case study we focus on the regulatory regime that existed from 
2006 until 2009. At that time DaE’s complaint was pending before the Commission, and handling it under EU 
sector-specific regulation might have been under consideration. As the provisions on congestion shifting in EU 
law have not fundamentally changed by the adoption of the 3
rd
 Energy Package in 2009, our analysis also 
reflects the current situation.  
It is important to note from the outset that EU law regulates cross-border congestion management only, 
namely congestion arising on interconnectors between the countries. Relieving congestion on internal 
transmission lines is subject to national rules on congestion management. Notwithstanding their limited scope, 
the EU rules impose restrictions on congestion shifting
131
 since it affects cross-border transmission capacities. 







 stipulated that TSOs are responsible for ensuring a secure, reliable and efficient 





, which is directly applicable in all Member States, spelled out common 
rules on cross-border congestion management, according to which non-discriminatory market based methods are 
preferred. They applied to congestion management on interconnectors, however not within the countries. 
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Nevertheless, Regulation 1228/2003 required all TSOs to give maximum interconnector capacity to the market, 
within the system security limits.
136
 The first version of Congestion Management Guidelines (CM Guidelines) 
annexed to the Regulation, while not imposing any specific (again, cross-border only) congestion management 
method on the TSOs, gave some indication of favoured mechanisms. Namely, they stated that “the possible 
merits of […] market splitting […] for solving ‘permanent congestion’ and counter-trading for solving 
‘temporary congestion’ shall be immediately explored as more enduring approach to congestion 
management.”
137
 Thus, both market splitting as well as counter-trading were explicitly mentioned in the CM 
Guidelines as the methods in preference for dealing with cross-border congestion. The CM Guidelines were 
amended by the end of 2006, which was shortly after DaE submitted its complaint to the Commission.
138
 The 
new version of these Guidelines explicitly stated in paragraph 1.7 that “TSOs shall not limit interconnection 
capacity in order to solve congestion inside their own control area”, save for the reasons of (a) operational 
security, (b) cost-effectiveness, and (c) minimization of negative impacts on the internal electricity market.
139
 If 
the TSO shifts internal congestion to the borders for any of these reasons, it needs to describe such instances and 
make it available in a transparent way to all the system users. Finally, according to this new version of the CM 
Guidelines, these exceptional cross-border capacity reductions were just a stopgap measure, and should not have 
been considered a permanent solution to congestion problems. They were allowed temporarily, until a long-term 
remedy was to be found. The Guidelines did not impose any deadlines to introduce long-term mechanisms to 
tackle congestion problems, but they required TSOs to develop plans for achieving such long-term solutions and 
to present them on a transparent basis to all system users.
140
  
The start of formal antitrust proceedings in the SvK case coincided with the adoption of the 3
rd
 Energy 
Package in 2009. The old Regulation 1228/2003 is now replaced with Regulation 714/2009
141
, however 
paragraph 1.7 of CM Guidelines on congestion shifting has been adopted in the 3
rd
 Energy Package as it stands 
and thus still remains applicable.
142
  
2. The existing EU regulation on congestion shifting – what does it mean for the TSOs? 
The previous subsection described the EU law on cross-border congestion management in relation to 
congestion shifting. In this section we argue that SvK’s practice of congestion shifting did not violate EU law.  
Under the existing EU regulatory regime, the national TSOs have some leeway as to the way they deal with 
internal congestion. Cross-border capacity reductions are allowed as a method of last resort, provided that 
network operators are transparent about them and can justify them on one of the three grounds set out in the CM 
Guidelines, that is, (a) operational security, (b) cost-effectiveness, and (c) minimization of negative impacts on 
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137 Supra n 33, Principles governing methods for congestion management, point 3. 
138 The Commission was empowered by the 2nd Energy Package to amend the CM Guidelines in order to ensure that congestion management 
methods in use are compatible with internal market objectives. Given the unsatisfactory results of the 2005 energy sector inquiry, the 
Commission amended the CM Guidelines already in 2006. Commission Decision of 9 Nov. 2006 amending the Annex to Regulation (EC) 
No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, 2006/770/EC, OJ L 312, 11 November 2006, 
59-65, and Article 8 (4) of Regulation 1228/2003. 
139 Ibid, para 1.7. Introduction of these exceptional grounds was strongly supported by Germany. 
140 Ibid, para 1.7. 
141 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, supra n 25. 








Operational security (a) is defined by the CM Guidelines as “keeping the transmission system within agreed 
security limits.”
144
 The system security reason, in particular, is a plausible justification, if counter-trading is not 
possible, for instance, due to the lack of suitable regulating resources. In order to avoid blackouts, a network 
operator might prefer to reduce the excessive flows in the grid already in the day-ahead market, by shifting 
congestion to the borders, instead of running the risk of failing to perform necessary counter-trading in real-time. 
From the operational security’s perspective congestion shifting could be thus considered a safer method than 
counter-trading.  
Justifying congestion shifting on the grounds of cost-effectiveness (b) is also possible. However, the concept 
of cost-effectiveness is not further explained, which somewhat complicates the assessment. The CM Guidelines 
are silent as to what cost should be considered in order to justify congestion shifting. Should it be cost for the 
society as a whole or the cost for the network operator only? In our companion article we look at congestion 
shifting from an economic welfare perspective and we find that a combination of congestion shifting and 
counter-trading may be socially optimal.
145
 In that case, shifting some congestion to the border reduces social 
cost in comparison to the other two methods (counter-trading alone or congestion shifting alone). Hence we 
show that a network operator can justify some congestion shifting on the grounds of (social) cost-effectiveness. 
If, on the other hand, we consider cost-effectiveness in a narrow sense, that is, as a cost for the TSO, the 
assessment is somewhat different. Since counter-trading is costly, the more congestion the network operator 
shifts to the border, the more cost-effective his congestion management is.
146
 Thus, with a narrowly defined 
concept of cost-effectiveness the network operator can justify not only some limited socially optimal amount of 
congestion shifting, but all its congestion shifting. In other words, depending on how the concept of costs is 
understood under the CM Guidelines, TSOs can justify either some or all of their congestion shifting on the 
grounds of cost-effectiveness.  
Minimization of negative impacts on the internal electricity market (c) is the third and last justification 
ground. Just as in the previous case, the Guidelines do not provide further explanation of this rather broad 
precondition. This allows for various interpretations, making it a catch-all criterion. Read in conjunction with (a) 
and (b), it allows for balancing the market integration objective with considerations of efficiency and operational 
security. Namely, various negative impacts of congestion shifting on internal market in a broad sense (for 
instance, reducing market liquidity, transparency, and competition in some areas, increasing uncertainty or 
market power), are weighed against efficiency losses and higher blackout risks connected to the increased 
reliance on counter-trading. Under such an interpretation of the Guidelines, the TSO could still shift some 
congestion to the borders and nevertheless comply with the Guidelines, provided it can demonstrate that the 
amount of congestion shifting is optimal and, at the same time, its negative effects on the neighbouring zones are 
reduced by the use of counter-trading. 
                                                          
143 As we explain further below, we do not consider market splitting an alternative to congestion shifting when analysing the three 
justification grounds (a-c) in the CM Guidelines. 
144 Note 1 of the CM Guidelines, supra n 142. 
145 Sadowska and Willems, supra n 55. 
146 Note, however, that even though counter-trading is costly for TSOs, those costs consist mainly of transfers to generators, and are therefore 





Having said that, we would like to remark that congestion shifting would be more difficult to justify (and 
this refers to all three justification grounds equally) if market splitting was considered an alternative option for 
the TSO, next to counter-trading and congestion shifting. For instance, operational security (a) can well be 
achieved by splitting the market into price zones, as it also eliminates risks connected to counter-trading, just as 
congestion shifting does. Regarding the second justification ground (b), it would be more difficult to accept cost-
saving reasons of congestion shifting if market splitting was an option for the TSO, regardless of what definition 
of costs we assume, whether that is social costs, or the costs to the TSO. In our companion article we show that 
market splitting is not only socially optimal, but it also brings higher revenues to the TSO than the case of 
shifting all of its congestion to the borders. Therefore, as long as market splitting is possible, it is as effective as 
congestion shifting in terms of minimising social cost, and is more effective than congestion shifting in terms of 
minimising costs to the TSO. Similar considerations regarding advantages of market splitting as a method 
minimising negative impacts on the internal market (c) apply. 
However, in our opinion, market splitting cannot provide a short-run viable alternative to congestion shifting 
and counter-trading in the light of paragraph 1.7 of the CM Guidelines. Market splitting constitutes a substantial 
change in national market design. It requires adaptation of market routines, IT systems and also national 
regulation, not to mention a certain degree of political endorsement. Implementation of market splitting takes 
time, therefore this solution cannot be taken into consideration when determining, under this provision, whether 
separate instances of congestion shifting are justified on the above listed grounds (a, b and c). The imprecise 
wording of CM Guidelines allows for such an interpretation. As mentioned in subsection D.1 above, instances of 
congestion shifting shall be tolerated only until a long-term solution to internal congestion is found. The 
provision leaves it to the network operators to develop the methodology and projects of a long-term solution, 
without giving further guidelines in that respect. Market splitting, which took SvK a year and a half to 
implement, can be considered a long-term (or at least medium-term) solution, which cannot be considered a 
readily available option for the network operator in case internal congestion occurs. For this reason we do not 
take market splitting into account, when discussing the three preconditions.
147
   
Summarizing subsection D.2, we conclude the following. First, current EU sector-specific regulation allows 
national TSOs to shift internal congestion to the borders. Even though the CM Guidelines generally do not 
permit congestion shifting, they formulate three justifications for doing so, which are broad and vague enough to 
justify much of current practice by many European network operators. This also the opinion of NordREG who 
stated in 2007 that congestion shifting is not as such prohibited by the EU law. It suggested that the Nordic TSOs 
can still ensure compliance with the 2006 CM Guidelines while shifting congestion to the borders, by describing 
transparently the reasons for cross-border capacity reductions and their effects.
148
 Second, the Commission 
would not have been able to impose market splitting in Sweden based on existing EU rules. Since the CM 
Guidelines regulate cross-border congestion management only, they do not impose any specific method for 
relieving internal congestion on national lines. If the network operator cannot relieve internal congestion without 
cross-border capacity reductions, the only requirement imposed by the EU law is to develop alternative methods 
                                                          
147 Also investments in grid reinforcements, which can take years of planning and building, can reduce the need for congestion management 
and congestion shifting in the long run. For instance, NordREG’s Report (8/2007) names the Nordel’s five prioritized investments in the 
Nordic grid, supra n 116, as long-term solutions to internal congestion in the meaning of the CM Guidelines. See NordREG, Congestion 
Management Guidelines (Compliance Report 8/2007), 10. However, we do not believe that network reinforcements will fully eliminate the 





to deal with such congestion in the long run and to present them transparently to the system users. Nevertheless, 
it is for TSOs to choose a long-term method and its introduction date.  
3. The new CACM network code and its impact on congestion shifting 
The EU regulation of cross-border congestion management does not stop with the adoption of the 3
rd
 Energy 
Package. Regulation 713/2009 of the 3
rd
 Package creates the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) with focus on cross-border issues and the internal energy market.
149
 Regulation 714/2009 of the 3
rd
 
Package establishes ENTSO-E, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, and 
mandates it to develop a cross-border capacity allocation and congestion management (CACM) network code.
150
 
The ENTSO-E’s final proposal for the CACM network code has been submitted to ACER for evaluation in 
September 2012,
151
 and is expected to enter into force in 2014 following the adoption by the Commission.
152
  
The CACM network code will take form of a binding EU Regulation, amending the CM Guidelines where 
necessary. It will be directly applicable in all Member States, without the requirement of transposition into 
national law. As with all other network codes developed by ENTSO-E, the CACM network code has to be in line 




 Those Framework Guidelines are themselves not 
legally binding, but they specify general requirements that the CACM network code should satisfy. As the 
CACM network code implements ACER’s Framework Guidelines and will become binding law, we focus our 
discussion on the code and not on the Framework Guidelines. 
Regulation 714/2009 provides that the CACM network code regulates cross-border and market integration 
issues, and should not replace national network codes which do not affect cross-border exchange.
155
 This 
wording suggests that the new network code should not interfere with regulation of congestion management at 
national level. In particular, it should not state whether a country should be split in smaller price zones or use 
counter-trading. However, any national arrangement which reduces export capacities to relieve internal 
congestion affects cross-border trade, and as such might be subject to the CACM network code. The CACM 
network code states that “[t]ransmission system operators will use a common set of remedial actions
 [156]
 to deal 
with both internal and cross zonal congestions” and that they “will coordinate the use of remedial actions in 
                                                          
149 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, supra n 25. 
150 The EU network codes define “obligations or requirements for entities that operate, plan or use the European electricity transmission 
system.” See ENTSO-E’s Network Codes Development Process, 17 February 2012, 4. 
151 At the time this article was submitted for publication, the CACM network code, in version submitted by ENTSO-E, was evaluated by 
ACER. In this article we refer to the ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, Network Code on Capacity Allocation and 
Congestion Management, which can be found at https://www.entsoe.eu/resources/network-codes/capacity-allocation-and-congestion-
management/ accessed on 1 November 2012.  
152 The EU network codes will be adopted by the Commission in a comitology process, according to the regulatory procedure with scrutiny 
(RPS). Article 6 (11) read in conjunction with Article 23 (2) of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009, supra n 25. See ENTSO-E Draft Work 
Program 2012-2013, version 26 June 2012, downloadable from https://www.entsoe.eu/the-association/entso-e-work-program/ accessed on 1 
November 2012, 6. 
153 ACER, Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for Electricty (ACER’s Framework Guidelines), FG-
2011-E-002, 29 July 2011, available at http://www.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ACER_HOME/Public_Docs accessed on 1 November 
2012. ACER’s Framework Guidelines were actually drafted by the European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), a body 
gathering the heads of all national energy regulatory bodies and advising the Commission on energy market issues. In 2011 ERGEG was 
dissolved and its tasks (also development of the Framework Guidelines) were taken over by ACER.  
154 As the third package provides for, the CACM network code has to be in line with the Framework Guidelines. Article 6 (6) of Regulation 
(EC) No 714/2009, supra n 25. 
155 Recital 7 and Article 8 (7) of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, supra n 25. 
156 Remedial actions are defined as measures to relieve physical congestions. Article 2 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final 




capacity calculation to facilitate more efficient capacity allocation.”
157
 The code thus foresees application of 
similar congestion management methods both for internal and cross-border lines at least at a regional level. This 
can include, for instance, counter-trading actions within zones, across zones or across countries; or 
internationally coordinated use of circuit breakers and switches to better address transmission constraints; or 
changes in network topology.
158
 Establishing such a common set of remedial actions will require harmonisation 
of national and regional congestion management rules.  
Moreover, the CACM network code is going to change how cross-border capacity is determined. Currently, 
transmission capacity available for trade between two countries is determined bilaterally for each interconnector 
by the neighbouring TSOs. This means that each of the two TSOs sets a forecasted capacity value for that 
interconnector given operational security constraints of their respective networks. The lower of the two values is  
then accepted as the transfer capacity available for trade to the market. This capacity is called the Net Transfer 
Capacity (NTC). The CACM network code foresees that capacity calculations shall be done in a coordinated 
way at least on a regional level and will be flow-based, although the implementation of those changes might take 
some years.
159
 The advantage of regional flow-based capacity calculation is that it takes the physical 
characteristics of the network into account  and therefore uses transmission capacity more efficiently.
160
 It will 
also prevent discrimination between capacities allocated to different interconnectors.
161
  
However, the regional flow-based capacity calculation method does not inhibit TSOs from discriminating 
between national and cross-border flows, and congestion shifting can still take place during the calculation of 
flow-based transmission capacities at the regional level. Regional capacity calculation will be based on data 
provided by the network operators. For their part, network operators will still need to make assumptions about 
energy flows that pass over their respective networks without international trade
162
 and under a number of 
                                                          
157 Recital 22 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151. 
158 Article 2 (2) of the CACM network code explicitly defines remedial actions which are not fully controlled by the TSO in charge of a 
control area in which congestion takes place as Cross Control Area Remedial Actions. This implies that remedial actions include actions to 
relieve internal congestion which are currently performed internally by the relevant TSOs. All TSOs within one Capacity Calculation Region 
shall coordinate regarding the use of remedial actions for capacity calculation and their real-time application (Recital 22 and Article 30 (6) of 
the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151). Further, each Coordinated Capacity Calculator 
(set at the regional level) shall optimize cross-border capacities using available remedial actions (Article 34 (6) of the CACM network code 
ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151). 
159 See Article 24 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151. Whereas the CACM network 
code strongly recommends the flow-based (FB) capacity calculation and allocation method, the use of NTC is still permitted, especially for 
non-meshed networks (e.g. the Nordic market) and in cases where the FB method does not (1) ensure system security, (2) lead to an increase 
in social welfare (3) provide market participants with sufficient time to adopt their processes. Further, the FB method has not been in 
operation yet and it requires more experiments with real data before its implemented. See ENTSO-E, Network code on Capacity Allocation 
& Congestion Management Supporting Document, A consultation document to support the assessment of the draft network code (Supporting 
Document), available at https://www.entsoe.eu/events/cacm-nc/ accessed on 1 November 2012, 19-20. 
160 Electricity flows through the transmission network according to the laws of physics, along the lines of least resistance between its source 
and destination, just like water flows through a network of canals. By assigning a certain transfer capacity to one interconnector (NTC) in 
order to enable a cross-border transaction, the network operator ignores the physics, because in reality the contracted electricity flows along 
many parallel interconnectors to reach the point of destination abroad. These “unscheduled” flows are taken into account in a  flow-based 
capacity calculation resulting in a more efficient use of interconnectors.  
161 This can be explained easily with an example. Suppose that country A can export to countries B and C. For the reasons of system security 
total exports (that is the sum of exports to countries B and C) must not exceed a fixed transmission capacity K, which is determined by the 
physical constraints of the network.  In the NTC approach, the network operator in country A would have to divide total export capacity over 
the cross-border lines in an ad-hoc way, by setting one NTC value for exports from A to B and one from A to C. In the flow-based approach, 
the network operator does not set a specific capacity value at each border, but gives all the information on the physical constraint to the 
power exchanges. Those exchanges will then simultaneously operate all regional price zones, ensuring efficient use of the network. Access to 
the transmission capacity will not be ad-hoc, but based on competitive pressure.  
162 Note that even if there is no international trade between price zones, flows in one price region might be influenced by loop flows caused 
by regional imbalances in other price zones. Those loop flows will not create net imports or exports in a price zone, but will affect individual 






 before determining how much transmission capacity is left for international trade. This method 
implicitly gives national flows priority over cross-border flows, and assumes that network operators will rely on 
counter-trading only to a limited extent. If this was the approach assumed in Sweden, it might have led to full 
congestion shifting in violation of Article 102 TFEU. Hence, depending on the actual implementation of the 
CACM network code, congestion shifting may still be possible.
164
 
Moreover, congestion shifting can take place not only during the calculation of flow-based transmission 
capacities, but also later, during the so-called validation phase. Namely, once the flow-based capacities are 
determined in a coordinated way for a region, they still need to be validated for each border by both 
neighbouring TSOs. During the validation process, TSOs can correct the capacities for reasons of system 
security.
165
 The CACM network code seems to be stricter than the CM Guidelines as it allows for cross-border 
capacity reduction only for reasons of system security, while the CM Guidelines allow for congestion shifting not 




While some provisions of the CACM network code leave scope to TSOs to shift congestion, other 
provisions impose reporting obligations, which might make congestion shifting more transparent and easier to 
detect. Firstly, TSOs need to report all reductions of cross-border capacities during the validation process, and to 
justify those reductions.
167
 Secondly, they need to list the location and frequency of congestion in their system, 
and provide a technical analysis of the existing price zones.
168
 In their reports, TSOs may recommend changes in 
the price zone configuration. On that basis national energy regulators can launch a review of existing price 





 This can lead to more efficient delineation of price zones in the long run.  
In summary, the new CACM network code is likely to affect existing methods of relieving internal 
congestion. In particular, establishing a region-wide set of remedial actions necessitates harmonisation of 
                                                          
163 Contingencies might include a failure of a single or multiple transmission lines, a sudden breakdown of a large power plant, or 
overloading of a transformator. Network operators often use an N-1 (or N-2) rule, which means that the network needs to remain stable even 
if one of its N components (or two components) breaks down. 
164 We see two reasons why the network operators could still shift congestion in the new model of regional capacity calculation set up by the 
upcoming CACM network code. (1) According to Article 30 (4) of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 
2012, supra n 151, in order to determine the available network capacity, network operators should try to maximize the available capacity by 
foreseeing non-costly remedial actions, (such as changes in network topology), but should not take into account costly remedial actions (such 
as counter-trading). Hence the capacity that is made available for cross-border capacity is calculated in such a way that there is no need to 
rely on counter-trading to eliminate congestion. As shown in our companion article, supra n 55, this is actually identical to the alleged abuse 
of SvK. (2) In the flow-based regional capacity calculation model electricity system will be represented with one node for each price zone, 
and the network operator needs to specify the so-called Generation Shift Keys, that is, how much an increase in electricity production in its 
price zone will affect the flows on each of the lines in the regional model (Article 29 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal 
of 27 September 2012, supra n 151). However, in reality, not all generation plants are located in the same location within the price zone, and 
the impact of a production increase on congestion will depend on the precise location of production. The network operator therefore needs to 
make assumptions on the typical location of generation within its network. For the Swedish network, SvK is likely to assume that cheap 
hydro power plants in the North are operating at full capacity, and therefore put a lot of weight on those production levels, leaving less 
capacity for cross-border trade.  
165 Article 31 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151. 
166 Article 31 (3) of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151. The code defines system 
security as “the ability of the power system to withstand unexpected disturbances or contingencies” (Article 2 (2)), while the CM Guidelines 
refer to operational security. We assume here that those concepts are identical. 
167 Article 31 (5) of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151. 
168 Article 40 of the CACM network code, ENTSO-E’s final proposal of 27 September 2012, supra n 151. 
169 With loopflows, zone borders do not necessarily need to be at the congested transmission lines. 
170 A review of price zone configuration can also be launched upon recommendation of ACER. See Article 37 (1) of the CACM network 




national arrangements. Despite that, congestion shifting will still be possible during the coordinated capacity 
calculation process. First, a flow-based capacity calculation method primarily addresses discrimination between 
different cross-border flows, but still implicitly gives national flows priority over cross-border flows. Second, 
TSOs can still shift congestion during the capacity validation phase, even though deviating from flow-based 
capacities is made more difficult (i.e. it can be done for system security reasons only). Nevertheless, additional 
reporting provisions improve transparency and trigger procedures which might mitigate the problem of 
congestion shifting in the long run, by introducing changes in network topology.  
4. Limits of the EU regulation 
Under the existing EU regulatory regime SvK would not be required to introduce market splitting in Sweden 
or to cease congestion shifting and increase counter-trading. The EU law regulates cross-border congestion 
management, whereas TSOs are free to choose their own methods to solve problems with internal congestion. 
Even though the EU law generally prohibits congestion shifting, because it reduces cross-border transmission 
capacities in favour of national network users, it leaves a wide scope of exception to this prohibition, allowing 
TSOs to shift congestion when needed and justify it on grounds of (a) operational security, (b) cost-
effectiveness, and (c) minimization of negative impacts on the internal electricity market. The upcoming CACM 
network code attempts to harmonise congestion management at regional level, but still leaves scope for 
congestion shifting, even though deviating from flow-based capacities will be limited to (a) operational security 
only. 
Given our discussion on the EU regulation of congestion management, we conclude that the commitments 
offered by SvK went beyond what the Commission could achieve on the EU regulatory front. While the EU 
regulation in force can only promote efficient management of internal congestion, without imposing on TSOs 
any specific congestion management method, the Commission, by means of competition enforcement, actually 
pushed through market splitting in Sweden. The same could be said with regard to the interim remedy. SvK 
committed to relieve internal congestion primarily through counter-trading and not to shift congestion to the 
borders, as long as it found available regulating resources.
171
 A regulatory equivalent of this remedy would 
amount to an outright ban on congestion shifting, whereas the EU regulation allows for broad exemptions so 
network operators can continue their current congestion management methods.  
The existing EU regulation appears to have reached its limits in terms of controlling congestion shifting. 
The deficiency of the legal framework derives to some extent from the Union’s limited competence to regulate 
energy markets. The current CM Guidelines regulate cross-border congestion management only, whereas 
congestion management on national electricity lines does not underlie the provisions of the EU Regulations, but 
remains in the Member State’s sphere of competence and is regulated in national network codes. As a result, 
transmission networks are governed by an unwieldy dual legal regime.  
We believe that further regulation based on this artificial separation of the transmission network into cross-
border and national lines will prove to be a futile exercise, given the physical complexity of transmission 
                                                          
171 In fact, SvK argued in the case that it would not be possible to completely eliminate congestion shifting and rely on counter-trading, due 
to lack of sufficient regulating resources. See Commission Decision, supra n 2, 49. In practice, SvK did shift congestion to the borders in the 
interim phase, whereas counter-trading could not be carried out, most often due to unavailability of suitable regulating resources in a given 
area. See Svenska Kraftnät, 2009/481, Swedish Interconnectors – COMP Case No 39.351, Monitoring Reports 1 – 7, available at 
http://www.svk.se/Start/English/Energy-Market/Electricity/Bakgrund/ accessed on 1 November 2012. This does not change the fact, 




systems. In a meshed network, any national transaction will also affect electricity flows over cross-border 
transmission lines, and by the same token, any international transaction will affect electricity flows over national 
transmission lines. Technically, it is thus impossible to separate national lines from interconnectors. Treating 
them as legally independent problems only frustrates progress in congestion management.
172
   
In our opinion, it would not make sense for the Commission to outright prohibit or limit congestion shifting 
under the EU regulation. Instead, we would suggest that the Commission, through or in cooperation with ACER, 
national energy regulators and TSOs, tackles market design head-on, using a more economics-based approach. 
International transmission capacity should be determined by balancing the costs of counter-trading against the 
benefits of cross-border trade. A large number of price zones should be introduced in order to limit the cost of 
counter-trading and ensure correct locational price signals.
173
 Once an efficient market design is in place, the 
legal discussion of congestion shifting will fade away. The upcoming CACM network code, taking a more 
comprehensive approach to congestion management, is somewhat promising in that respect. We hope that the 
new provisions will not ignore the organisation of internal congestion management schemes, consider the 





Our article illustrates how the Commission uses competition rules in the SvK case to foster electricity market 
integration in the Nordic countries. We analyse this case against the backdrop of political debate on market 
splitting that was ongoing in the Nordic countries, particularly in Sweden, and the existing EU regulation on 
cross-border congestion management.  
We find that the Commission employed Article 102 TFEU in a rather contrived manner by considering 
national congestion management an EU internal market problem and therefore also a competition law problem. 
Namely, it argued that SvK hampered cross-border trade and discriminated on the basis of nationality, thus 
violating competition rules. Whereas the Commission’s anticompetitive analysis focused on internal market 
issues, important aspects of SvK’s alleged abuse could have been objectively justified For example, there could 
have been possible efficiency benefits of shifting congestion and maintaining a single electricity price in public 
interest. But these possible objective justifications were left off the table by the Commission.  
Dealing with the SvK case under commitment procedure made it easier for the Commission to put market 
integration arguments under the umbrella of Article 102 TFEU and to use competition policy to reach its 
objective of an integrated electricity market. The standard of proof is much lower in the commitment procedure. 
The Commission is not required to find an abuse, but merely to formulate its anticompetitive concerns. And 
there exist no formal procedures which would take objective justification into consideration. Even though market 
                                                          
172 Fortunately, this problem is well-understood by the stakeholders and some aspects are voluntarily harmonized at the regional level. For 
instance, even though EU law regulates the use of cross-border congestion rents, Nord Pool applies this provision also to congestion rents 
collected from internal bottlenecks. 
173 In order for network users to receive the right signals for their consumption, production and investments decisions, prices should reflect 
the cost of electricity and therefore be differentiated according to location. Prices should be lower in Nord Sweden where cheap hydro 
production is available and higher in Stockholm, because both setting up generation plants in South Sweden as well as building transmission 




participants have an opportunity to share their views on commitments in the market test, this phase is quick and 
their concerns can be too easily dismissed by the Commission.  
The Commission’s focus on fostering market integration through competition policy might backfire, as its 
assessment lacks solid economic underpinnings, and does not provide correct insights as to how congestion 
problems should be solved. Furthermore, it does not contribute to the development of a sound EU regulatory 
framework for congestion management. Had the Commission instead used an efficiency standard in its 
anticompetitive analysis, it would have resulted in a more nuanced assessment as to whether SvK abused its 
dominant position by shifting congestion. A thorough economic analysis of the case would have provided more 




As a result of this case, SvK changed its congestion management by introducing market splitting in Sweden. 
Market splitting is a transparent and efficient way to deal with congestion, which, unlike counter-trading, gives 
optimal, long-term investment incentives to generators and brings the network operator additional revenue to 
finance future grid investments. Therefore, we believe that market splitting provides an economically sound 
solution to Swedish congestion in the long run. However, market splitting alone does not prevent future potential 
abuses, as SvK could still manipulate capacity declarations in order to relieve internal congestion. In any case, 
market splitting brings more transparency to the market, and thus simplifies detection of congestion shifting. 
Judging from the SvK case, competition enforcement appears to be a convenient industrial policy tool for 
the Commission in situations where there is no significant progress on the EU regulatory front and where 
national interests and industry groups successfully defend existing market arrangements. The Commission’s 
antitrust action against SvK changed the Swedish congestion management system in a surprisingly fast and 
unproblematic manner. Neither Swedish policy makers, nor the existing EU regulation could have achieved the 
same result as quickly and effectively. However, we do not believe that the Commission is likely to use similar 
antitrust actions against other network operators, and will, for the time being, allow ACER, national energy 
regulators and ENTSO-E to harmonise congestion management regimes at the EU level by issuing further 
regulatory measures based on the 3
rd
 Energy Package in the form of guidelines and the EU network codes.  
It was relatively easy to introduce market splitting in Sweden, as local political support for market splitting 
was growing, preparatory steps of splitting the Swedish market were ongoing, and the market players had a 
decade-long experience with market splitting in Elspot, the Nordic day-ahead electricity market. This might be 
hard to repeat elsewhere, given that governments are generally hostile towards market splitting, and market 
participants are inexperienced with respect to new methods of congestion management. An efficient solution to a 
complex techno-economic problem such as congestion management is certainly not going to come from 
competition policy alone, but also through changes on the regulatory front. Efficient EU network codes need to 
be put in place and enforced, and capacity declarations need to be monitored by the national energy regulators. 
The problem of congestion shifting is probably only going to be solved once cross-border and internal 
congestion are treated identically, and sufficiently small price zones are introduced. This will require close 
coordination between power exchanges and network operators, and clear guidance from sector-specific 
regulation, both at the EU and national levels. 
                                                          
174 See n 160. 
